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COMMENT
TI NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S
"INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES" POLICY:
AN ADMINISTRATIVE GRANDFATHER CLAUSE
In carrying out its statutory responsibility to determine whether a
unit of craft employees, rather than a broader unit, is appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining,1 the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Board) ordinarily must strike a balance
between sharply conflicting interests.2 One or more groups of specially
skilled workmen will desire to be disassociated from other employees
in order to obtain relatively superior terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The employer will probably oppose separate representation for
the specialists, believing it not conducive to stable labor relations.' And
often an incumbent union, which has represented the specialists as well
as other employees, will oppose its craft rival in order to maintain its
bargaining strength, membership, and jurisdiction.
In American Potash & Chem. Corp.,- the Board ruled that crafts-
men may be represented separately from a broader bargaining unit
"where a true craft group is sought and where, in addition, the union
seeking to represent it is one which traditionally represents that craft."'
This general rule is presently applied to permit separate craft repre-
sentation in all but four so-called "integrated industries": the "basic
1 In 1935, Congress charged the National Labor Relations Board with responsibility
to "decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their
right to self-organization and to collective bargaining,... the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit
or subdivision thereof." National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(b), 49
Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958).2 See W C. Hamilton & Sons, 104 N.L.R.B. 627, 635 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
3 A large majority of employers who responded to a study conducted at the Univer-
sity of Michigan in 1959 believed that craft severance was not conducive to stable labor
relations. Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MICH. L. REV.
313, 325 (1960). "Fear is the principal reason for opposing the severance of craft
groups. This fear arises principally from two sources: from what is considered to be
another threat to continued production and from the belief that, if more craft units are
severed, it will not be possible to overcome the ill effects which are believed to be
connected with severance."
Id. at 326. Cf. McConkey, The NLRB and Technological Change, 13 LAB. L.J. 43
(1962).




steel" industry, the wet-milling industry, the lumber industry, and the
aluminum industry.
An examination of the Board's policy of excluding these "integrated
industries" from its general rule must begin by noting a limitation
upon the Board's broad discretion in determining whether separate
craft representation is appropriate. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act7
added the following italicized proviso to section 9(b) of the Wagner
Act:8
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employ-
ees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided,
that the board shall not... (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate
for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established
by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the
proposed craft unit vote against separate representation....
This amendment was apparently prompted by Congressional conviction
that rules previously developed by the Board had been unduly preju-
dicial to craft employees in plants initially organized by industrial
unions. Specifically, it was intended to overrule the American Can"
doctrine, which prohibited separate representation to craft employees
in plants which were covered by a current bargaining contract secured
by an industrial union.Y Whereas a House Bill would have required
6 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 695, 698 (1957); American Potash
& Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 n.6 (1954).
7Labor Management Relations Act § 9(b) (2), 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1958) (Emphasis added.) [hereinafter cited as "the Act!'].8 National Labor Relations Act, supra note 1.
9 American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
10 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare's report stated:
Since the decision in the Atnerican Can case... where the Board refused to permit
craft units to be "carved out!' from a bargaining unit already established, the Board,
except under unusual circumstances, has virtually compelled skilled artisans to
remain parts of a comprehensive plant unit. The Committee regards the application
of this doctrine as inequitable. Our bill still leaves to the Board discretion to review
all the fadts in determining the appropriate unit, but it may not decide that any
craft unit is inappropriate on the ground that a different unit has been established
by a prior Board determination .... Section 9(b): The several amendments to
this subsection propose to limit the Board's discretion in determining the kind of
unit appropriate for collective bargaining.... (2) In determining whether members
of a craft unit may be separated from a larger unit the Board may not dismiss a
craft petition on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior
determination. This overrules the American Can rule (supra).
S. REP. No. 105 in 1 NLRB LEGISLArIVE HISTORY oF THE LABOR MAxAGEmENT RmLA-
TIONS Acr, 1947 416-18, 431 (1948) [hereinafter cited "LEG. HiST."] See H.R. REP.
No. 245, 1 LEG. HIsT. 327-28. On the Senate floor, Senator Taft declared:
Today the situation is that when a new plant is organized the Board ordinarily per-
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the Board, upon application, to direct a separate representation election
for any distinguishable group of craftsmen,1 the Senate Bill, which
was enacted, prohibited the Board from denying separate represen-
tation to craft employees "on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination."'"
Congress did not define the precise limits which the new proviso to
section 9(b) was to place upon the Board's discretion. Rejection of the
House Bill' suggests that the Board was not required to give craftsmen
an opportunity to vote for separate representation in every instance.
Further, nothing in the legislative history of section 9(b) (2) suggests
that the Board was prohibited from relying consistently upon certain
established factors, such as integration of production processes or bar-
gaining history, in dismissing petitions for proposed craft units. How-
ever, it is clear that the Board was not to treat as res judicata a prior
decision which determined that a bargaining unit other than a craft unit
was appropriate. The facts of each case were to control Board deci-
mits the craft memberg of that plant to vote as to whether they will have a special
craft union or join a general plant union. The Board has followed the desires of
the craft unit on that question. But if at the time of the first certification a craft
unit is not organized, or if no action is taken, and if by default they are all included
in a plant union which is certified to [sic] the Board, the Board has taken the posi-
tion that after 1 year of such bargaining no craft union will be recognized or given
an opportunity to be heard in connection with establishing a craft unit. All this bill
does it [sic] to provide that such a previous finding shall not have that effect, and
that if a year later the craft people want to form a separate union they shall have
the same consideration at that time as they would have had if they had taken that
action when the plant was first organized. In effect I think it gives greater power
to the craft units to organize separately. It does not go the full way of giving them
an absolute right in every case; it simply provides that the Board shall have discre-
tion and shall not bind itself by previous decisions, but that the subject shall always
be open for further consideration by the Board.
2 LEo. HIsT. 1009; See 2 Lao. HIST. 1067 (remarks of Senator Ellender); 2 LEG. lIST.
1498 (remarks of Senator Ball). For the Board's position regarding craft severance
prior to 1947, see generally Jones, Self-Deterinination vs. Stability of Labor Relations,
58 Micn. L. REv. 313, 315-17 (1960) ; Freiden, Craft and Splinter Units, N.YU. 7TH
ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 119, 122-24 (1954) ; Albers, Union Jurisdiction, 4 LAB. L.J.
183, 185-87 (1953); Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit Bargaining, 59
YALE L.J. 1023, 1027-31 (1950). See 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 65-66 (1941). Compare 4
NLRB ANN. REP. 87 n.60 (1940); 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 61 (1943); 8 NLRB ANN.
REP. 54 (1944); 9 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1944); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 28 (1946); 11
NLRB ANN. REP. 24 (1947); 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 19-20 (1948).
11 H.R. 3020, § 9(f) (2), 1 LEo. HisT. 188-89.
Upon application of any interested person or persons, the Board shall direct the
Administrator to provide for a separate ballot for any craft, department, trade,
calling, profession or other distinguishable group within a proposed bargaining
unit, and shall exclude from the bargaining unit any such group if less than a
majority of the employees in it who cast ballots shall have voted for the representa-
tive that the Board shall certify for such unit.
See H.R. REP. No. 510, 1 LEG. HIsT. 551.
12 S. 1126 § 9(b) (2), 1 LEo. HisT. 117. See S. RFP. No. 105, 1 LEo. HIST. 431,
quoted supra note 10.
1s See note 11 supra.
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sions;"' the subject of craft representation was "always to be open for
further consideration by the Board." 5
I. NATIONAL TUBE TO AmERICAN POTASH
The Board first considered the import of section 9 (b) (2) in National
Tube Co.? The Bricklayers Union petitioned to represent a separate
unit of bricklayers who constructed and repaired blast furnaces at a
plant producing "basic steel."17 For six years the bricklayers had
been included in a certified multiple-plant production and maintenance
unit represented by the United Steelworkers. The petitioning union
contended that section 9(b) (2) made craft severance mandatory. It
argued that the words "a prior Board determination," coupled with a
slight change in the statutory language setting forth the Board's affirm-
ative obligations, precluded the Board from considering any factors
previously relied upon in determining the appropriateness of proposed
craft units1 This contention was rejected by the Board.
The Board reasoned that it had not been prohibited from considering
prior bargaining history in a whole industry as a controlling factor
because the American Can doctrine had reference only to the bargain-
ing history of particular employers. Further, because the words "a
prior Board determination" were not synonymous with the American
Can doctrine, the Board was not certain that Congress intended to
eliminate even particular employers' bargaining history as a controlling
factor. The Board concluded, "[1]t is clear that the only restriction
imposed by Section 9(b) (2) is that such prior determination or bar-
gaining history may not be the soZe ground upon which the Board may
decide that a craft unit is inappropriate without an election."19 Taking
into consideration the steel industry's bargaining history on a broader
basis, the intimate connection of the bricklayers' work with production
processes at the plant, and the integration of operations in the steel
industry as reflected in its wage structure, the Board dismissed the
bricklayers' craft petition.
'4 "Our bill still leaves to the Board discretion to review all the facts in determining
the appropriate unit... ." S. REP. No. 105, 1 LEG. HIST. 418, quoted .mpra note 10.
152 La. HIST. 1009 (remarks of Senator Taft), quoted supra note 10.
16 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
17 Id. at 1200.
28 Id. at 1202. The Wagner Act directed the Board to determine the appropriate-
ness of proposed bargaining units "in order to insure employees the full benefit of the
right to self-organization and to collective bargaining' National Labor Relations
Act § 9(b), supra note 1. The Taft-Hartley amendment changed this language to
read, "in order to assure the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
this act." Labor Management Relations Act § 9(b), supra note 7.




Between 1948 and 1954, separate representation was denied craft
employees in other plants which were classified as being within the
"basic steel" industry."0 However, separate representation for craft
employees was permitted in three steel fabrication plants,2 a plant in
which steel plant equipment was manufactured,2 a plant producing
steel tubing,2" and a steel foundry. 4 Criteria for classification of par-
ticular plants as being within the "basic steel" industry became prob-
lematical. In one case the Board specifically relied upon a classifica-
tion made by the War Labor Board in 1944.25 In a later case, however,
the Board stated, "[T]he mere fact that companies whose operations
are similar to those of the Employer happen to be involved in the War
Labor Board case does not offer a persuasive reason for finding the
Employer to be engaged in the basic steel industry."2
In Electro-Metallurgical Co.,2  the "basic steel" classification was
extended to include a ferro-alloy plant. The ferro-alloys were produced
by a heat separation process which depended upon electricity from the
employer's powerhouse; these alloys were subsequently sold to steel
companies for use in manufacturing alloy and specialty steels. The
Board found the production process to be "almost identical with that in
the basic aluminum industry"2 and, in addition, found that the process
was "an essential preliminary step in the basic steel industry."29 Em-
ployees in the powerhouse division, who sought separate representation,
had been included in a plant-wide bargaining unit for nine years, and
industrial bargaining prevailed at the employer's thirteen other plants.
The Board concluded:
Because of the close integration and interdependence of the production
processes at the... plant, because the production of ferro-alloys consti-
20 Scullin Steel Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 530 (1951) (plant produced ingot steel and steel
castings); Baldwin Locomotive Works, 78 N.L.R.B. 803 (1948) (plant produced
forged and rolled steel products); American Rolling Mills Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1209
(1948) (steel mill and fabrication plant).
21 Ingersoll Products Div., 100 N.L.R.B. 1531 (1952); Rheem Mfg. Co., 100
N.L.R.B. 564 (1952); Standard Steel Spring Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1805 (1950); see
Bushnell Steel Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 669 (1951); Baldwin Locomotive Works, 89 N.L.R.B.
403 (1950); C.H. Wheeler Mfg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 861 (1949).
22 Mesta Mach. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1624 (1951); see Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 105
N.L.R.B. 723 (1953).
22 Globe Steel Tubes Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 772 (1952).
24 General Steel Castings Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 607 (1952).
25 Baldwin Locomotive Works, 78 N.L.R.B. 803, 804 (1948).
26 Globe Steel Tubes Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 772, 774 (1952).
27 101 N.L.R.B. 577 (1952).
28 Id. at 578. See text accompanying notes 62-64, infra.
29 Id. at 579.
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tutes a part of the basic steel processes, and because the history of collec-
tive bargaining at the Employer's plants... and in the basic steel industry
generally has been predominantly on the basic [.Sic] of industrial units, we
believe that the Board should not disturb the established plant-wide unit
at the employer's... plant... .0
B. Automobile Manufacturing
In Ford Motor Co.,,' National Tube was cited as authority for deny-
ing craft representation to a proposed unit of maintenance electricians
in an automobile manufacturing plant. Assembly lines in the plant
were powered by electricity; the maintenance electricians constantly
inspected and repaired electrical equipment on the production floor.
Although no union had previously represented these employees, the
employer's sixteen other plants were separately organized into plant-
wide production and maintenance units. The Board concluded:
"[W]here... electricians regularly and repetitively perform such in-
dispensable assembly-line operations as to constitute an integral part
of the production process, we believe that they should be included....
in a plant wide unit." 2
Although the Ford case was followed in General Motors Corp33 and
Dodge San Leandro Plant,8 the Board apparently never decided that
separate craft representation was inappropriate in the whole automo-
bile manufacturing industry." With respect to assembly-line opera-
tions, the Ford doctrine was subsequently modified in Cadillac Motor
Car Div."8
so Ibid. Chairman Herzog and Member Peterson, dissenting, insisted that the
production processes and products of the ferro-alloy plant differed materially from
those in plants which had previously been classified as "basic steel." 101 N.L.R.B. at
580. Nor did production processes in the plant seem to depend upon work performed
by powerhouse employees to a greater degree than production processes in steel plants
outside the "basic steel" category depended upon work performed by maintenance
eleqtricians who were permitted to vote for separate representation. Compare 101
N.L.R.B. at 578 with General Steel Castings Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 607, 608 (1952).
3' 78 N.L.R.B. 887, 889 n.5 (1948).
32 Id. at 889.
3s 79 N.L.R.B. 341 (1948).
31180 N.LR.B. 1031 (1948).35 See Ford Motor Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 813 (1952). Although the automobile manufac-
turing industry is not generally considered to be an "integrated industry," the Ford
case has been cited with National Tube on numerous occasion. as authority for the
Board's policy of denying craft severance in industries in which craft employees'
work is integrated with production processes. See, e.g., Raytheon Mfg. Co., 98
N.L.R.B. 785, 787 n.6 (1952) ; Ravenna Arsenal, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 1, 5 (1952) ; Hud-
son Pulp & Paper Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1018, 1019 n.3 (1951); General Mills, Inc., 91
N.L.R.B. 984, 987 n.4 (1950) ; Baldwin Locomotive Works, 89 N.L.R.B. 403, 406 n.10
(1950) ; Aluminum Ore Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 121, 124 (1949); Roane-Anderson Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 30, 33 n.6 (1949) ; 13 NLRB AxN. REP. 36 (1950).
36 94 N.L.R.B. 217 (1951).
1965]
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In Cadillac, the Board permitted a craft unit of maintenance elec-
tricians to vote for separate representation. Tanks were to be produced
in a new plant on a "mass production assembly line basis, similar to
that used in the manufacture of automobiles." 7 Though separately
supervised, the electricians spent ninety per cent of their working time
keeping production machinery in operation. The Board stated that
application of the Ford doctrine depended upon facts which disclosed
that "the employees who seek to sever from a plant wide unit perform
routine and repetitive operations under production supervision; in
other words they must be integrated and inseparable from the produc-
tion process, a situation which does not exist here.""8 Although the
opinion in the Ford case did not reveal that the petitioning maintenance
electricians had been supervised in common with other production em-
ployees, in other cases in which the Ford doctrine had been held inap-
plicable, craft employees had been under separate immediate super-
vision. 9
C. Wet-Milling
The wet-milling industry was added to the Board's category of "inte-
grated industries" in three cases involving the Corn Products Refining
Co. In 1945, the Board dismissed representation petitions which pro-
posed separate units of machinists, boiler room employees, power house
employees, and maintenance electricians in the company's Pekin, Illi-
nois plant.4" The Board found all maintenance work in the plant to be
functionally integrated with production processes. The maintenance
employees had been included in a plant-wide unit for four years, and
plant-wide bargaining generally prevailed in the wet-milling industry.
But, in addition to these factors, the Board noted that, "With the
exception of that claimed by the IBEW, these proposed units overstep
craft and/or department lines, comprising heterogeneous groups of
employees, inappropriate bases for bargaining units irrespective of
other factors involved herein.""
In the second Corn Products case, representation petitions were again
submitted for proposed units of boiler room employees, power house
37 Id. at 221 (Emphasis added).
38 Id. at 221 (Emphasis added).
3 9 E.g., International Harvester Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1451, 1453 (1948) ; United States
Gypsum Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1282 (1948). Separate immediate supervision was appar-
ently a decisive factor in a later case, involving an aircraft engine plant, in which
separate craft representation was permitted. Ford Motor Co. Aircraft Engine Div.,
96 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1078 (1951). But see Ford Motor Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 813 (1952).
40 Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 92 (1945).
41 Id. at 95.
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employees, and maintenance electricians at the Pekin, Illinois plant.2
The Board found that the proposed units of boiler room and power
house employees did not cross departmental lines, but that the em-
ployees' "integration and interrelation of interest"' with production
and other maintenance workers remained unchanged since the earlier
decision. The proposed unit of electricians, however, would exclude
probationary helpers and alteration electricians; the latter were the
most skilled electricians in the plant. The Board said:
We customarily find inappropriate for severance a craft group from which
are arbitrarily excluded the most skilled members of the craft,, or other
employees who might normally expect to achieve craft status'after serving
a probationary period. As the electrical unit is thus inappropriate, and
as no persuasive evidence was adduced.., that the Engineers and Fire-
men are any less an integral part of the production process now than they
were at the time of the Board's earlier decision, we conclude.. that the
factors there relied upon continue to present compelling reason for the
existing over-all bargaining unit."
The basis for the Board's decisions in these two cases is not entirely
dear. All but one of the units requested in the first case did not com-
prise true craft groups, and one of the units requested in the second
case did not include all the employees in the craft; separate grounds
might have been stated for dismissing the petitions for those units.&"
But it became clear in the third Corn Products case' that the Board
considered craft representation inappropriate in the wet-milling indus-
try as a whole. The Board dismissed a craft petition in the company's
new plant at Corpus Christi, Texas:
In earlier cases, involving other domestic plants of the Employer, the
Board has held that only plant-wide production and maintenance units
were appropriate because of the community of employee interests arising
from the functional integration of the "wet-milling" process, and because
the industry generally appears to have followed the pattern of bargaining
in plant-wide units.... The evidence in the instant case reveals the same
compelling reasons which supported the Board's decisions in these cases.' 7
2 Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 80 N.I.R.B. 362 (1948).
43Id. at 364.
"Id. at 365.
45 See Ralston Purina Co, 86 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 n.9 (1949).
"6 Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 187 (1949).
47 Id. at 190-91. The Board's previous holdings applied only to the company's plant
at Pelin, Illinois. See text accompanying notes 40, 42 supra. A unit of machinists was
separately represented at the company's plant in Argo, Illinois. Corn Prod. Ref. Co.,
56 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1944); Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 1324 (1943). Although
craft severance was later denied in the wet-milling industry, Union Starch & Ref. Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 3 (1950), General Mills Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 984 (1950), the Board per-




The Board did not definitively classify the lumber industry as an
"integrated industry" until December 1949. Prior to that time it had
dismissed petitions for severance of bargaining units comprised of oper-
ators of heavy power equipment in a logging construction crew'" and
a woods operation, " and of mobile equipment operators in a lumber
mill." It had also determined that a single unit comprised of employees
at a sawmill and planing mill was appropriate, rather than a unit
limited to sawmill employees alone." On the other hand, separate rep-
resentation had been permitted for units of truck drivers at logging
operations,52 and for a unit of machinists at a sawmill.5" Similarly, units
of employees in lumber manufacturing departments which included a
sawmill and planing mill, excluding employees at nearby logging opera-
tions, had been found appropriate.5
In Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.,5 craft representation was requested
for separate units of logging employees, electricians, and powerhouse
employees in the employer's logging and sawmill operations. Many of
the employees were interchanged between logging and mill operations
and were under common supervision; all were subject to uniform terms
and conditions of employment. Taking note of a "historically consist-
ent and uniform absence of craft groups from the processes of bargain-
ing in the lumber industry," the Board stated:
The development of successful maintenance and production processes and
methods in the lumber industry has been accomplished by an integration
and specialization which has foreclosed the existence of distinct and well
defined craft work. In view of the comprehensive and consistent history
of industrial bargaining and the extensive integration of all production
and maintenance work, and the fact that the industry has tended to
develop specialists rather than workmen in the craft tradition, we believe
that separate representation is not appropriate for employees in the lumber
industry. 56
(1953); Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 536 (1951); Ralston Purina
Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 107 (1949).
48 Simpson Logging Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 375 (1949).
49 E.g., Winton Lumber Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 334 (1948).
50 Sound Lumber Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 207 (1948).
51J.N. Bray Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 388 (1949) ; Johnson Lumber Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1181
(1948).52 Vancouver Plywood & Veneer Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 708 (1948) ; Tongaw & Olson,
Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 810 (1948).
58 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 820 (1949).5 4 Plywood-Plastics Corp., 85 N.L.RLB. 265 (1949) ; Flodin Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B.
889 (1949).
55 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949).56 Id. at 1082. See note 79, infra.
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Between December 1949, and March 1954, Weyerhaeuser precluded
separate representation for truck drivers who hauled lumber at logging
sites" or between logging and sawmill operations,"8 and for powerhouse
employees at a lumber manufacturing plant.5 In some cases, the Board
held that Weyerhaeuser foreclosed separate representation to sawmill
or logging employees in the lumber industry."0 But in other lumber in-
dustry cases, bargaining units limited to logging or sawmill employees
alone were found to be appropriate." In these cases, the Board found
little "integration" between logging and sawmill employees because of
distance, separate supervision, and separate hiring policies. In addi-
tion, no union sought to represent both groups in a single unit and there
was no history of collective bargaining with the employers in question.
E. Aluminum
In Permanente Metals Corp.,2 the aluminum industry was classified
as an "integrated industry" because the record "presented... cogent
evidence of the integrated and interdependent character of the more
basic operations in the aluminum industry and its similarity in major
respects to the basic steel industry";6" and "because of the history of
collective bargaining in the industry on a predominantly industrial pat-
tern." Permanente Metals expressly overruled a case decided less
than a year earlier, in which separate representation had been permit-
ted for five craft units in the Reynolds Metals Company's aluminum
reduction plant in Troutdale, Oregon." And in a case decided on the
57 Magnolia Lumber Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 161 (1950) ; White River Lumber Co., 88
N.L.R.B. 158 (1949) ; Crown Zellerbach Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1324 (1949) ; Nettleton Tim-
ber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1319 (1949).
5sWeyerhaeuser Timber Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 155 (1950); Peshastin Lumber & Box
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 226, 26 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1950).
0 .C Olson Lumber Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 856 (1953).60 Townsend Sash, Door & Lumber Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 950 (1951); Enterprise Lum-
ber & Supply Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 784 (1951) ; Ross Lumber Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 636 (1951) ;
J.G. Howard Lumber Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1951); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 887 (1951); Northern Redwood Lumber Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 272 (1950); see
Inyo Lumber Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1951) (unit of employees under yard foreman
at dry yard inappropriate).
61 Ivory Pine Co. of California, 107 N.L.R.B. 19 (1953) (logging employees);
Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794 (1952) (separate units of logging and
mill employees) ; Brown Wood Preserving Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952) (logging
employees); Michigan-California Lumber Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1951) (mill em-
ployees) ; Hamilton Bros. Logging Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1549 (1950) (logging employees).
62 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950).
03 Id. at 811.
64 Ibd. But see, Aluminum Ore Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 121, 124 n.14 (1949) ; Reynolds
Metals Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 110, 113 (1949).




same day as Permanente Metals, the Board dismissed another craft
petition from the Reynolds Metals plant in Troutdale."
Craft representation was subsequently denied a proposed unit of
machinists at a plant in which alumina was separated from bauxite
ore. 7 However, separate craft representation was permitted in an
aluminum plant devoted to scrap reclamation,8 a plant in which alumi-
num foil was manufactured from aluminum coil," and a plant in which
aluminum die castings were manufactured. 0 The Board found that
operations at these plants were not "basic aluminum" operations. Nor
was the work performed by craftsmen at these plants sufficiently inte-
grated with production processes to preclude separate representation.
F. Uranium Separation: An Unique Case
Although craft representation was generally permitted in the atomic
energy industry,' in Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co."2 craft representa-
tion was denied a proposed unit of maintenance electricians in a K-25
atomic energy plant separating uranium 235 from other uranium iso-
topes by the gaseous diffusion process. The maintenance electricians
were found to be "skilled craftsmen, such as the Board generally grants
separate representation.17' However, these employees were specially
trained to work in the plant and worked closely with process-operating
employees. Citing National Tube, Ford, the third Corn Products case,
Weyerhaeuser, and Permanente Metals, the Board concluded: "[W] e
believe that the integration of operations in this type of atomic energy
plant and the close relationship of the maintenance electricians to pro-
duction are such as to make it impracticable and unfeasible to sever the
employees involved in this petition from the plantwide unit. 7 4
By March 1954, the Board had developed a policy of denying sep-
arate representation to craft employees in four "integrated industries."
Some exceptions had also developed: A ferro-alloy plant had been
placed in the "basic steel" category.75 The Weyerhaeuser decision,
though purportedly applicable to the whole lumber industry, did not
66 Reynolds Metals Co, 89 N.L.R.B. 802 (1950).
8 7 Reynolds Metals Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 156 (1950).6 8 Reynolds Metals Co., 93 N.L.RB. 721 (1951).6 9 Aluminum Foils, Inc., 94 N.LR.B. 806 (1951).
70 Aluminum Co. of America, 96 N.L.R.B. 781 (1951).
71 General Elec. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1952) ; Roane-Anderson Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 30
(1949). See Phillips Petroleum Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1207 (1954); Motorola Inc., 94
N.L.R.B. 1163 (1951).
72102 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1953).
73 Id. at 1177.
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preclude sawmill and logging employees from bargaining separately in
exceptional circumstances."' And craft severance had been found inap-
propriate in an unique atomic energy plant."' Despite these exceptions,
the four "integrated industries" had two things in common: In each,
employers generally bargained with representatives of employees in an
entire plant or operation,"8 and in each the work done by craftsmen had
a direct relation to production processes."9 Development of the "inte-
grated industries" policy was abruptly terminated in March 1954.
II. AmERICAN POTASH AND THE "INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES"
GRANDFATHER CLAUSE
A contention that the "National Tube doctrine" should "be applied
to the chemical industry, or, at least, to the basic chemical industry,180
prompted the Board to review its policy of denying craft representation
on an industry-wide basis, in American Potash & Chem. Corp.81 The
Board turned again to the legislative history of section 9 (b) (2), observ-
74 Ibid. Compare Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 437, 442-43 (1950),
which involved the same plant. In that case, the Board dismissed four craft peti-
tions but did not reach the integrated industries issue because the proposed craft units
were, among other defects, too limited in scope. See note 88 infra.
75 See text accompanying notes 28-30 .-upra.
76 See text accompanying note 61 s-upra.
77 See text accompanying notes 72-74 .upra; note 97 infra.
78 Of course, this factor was not present with respect to the K-25 atomic energy
plant in Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1953). See id. at 1177 n.10.
79 Finding craft representation inappropriate in the lumber industry in Weyer-
haeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949), the Board specifically relied upon a
third factor not mentioned in cases in other "integrated industries": "the fact that the
industry has tended to develop specialists rather than workmen in the craft tradition.'
Id. at 1082. The Board found that each maintenance employee for whom separate
representation was sought wag "expected to have the skills and ability to handle both
his own specialty and other mechanical and electrical problems," and many were called
upon to use those skills as "maintenance teams." Id. at 1081. It would seem that many
craftsmen in industries in which production and maintenance processes are highly
integrated are "specialists" in this sense, and that the "specialist" characteristic was
not really an independent third factor in the Board's consideration. On the other hand,
if the proposed craft units at the Weyerhaeuser mill comprised heterogenous groups
of "maintenanced' employees, they were inappropriate without regard to the "integrated
industries" classification. See, e.g., General Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 984, (1950);
Corn Prod. Ref. Co, 60 N.LRB. 92, 95 (1945) ; compare E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 723, 726 (1957) (craft representation denied because unique in-
tricacies of plant produced "very specialized workmen particularly adapted to the
processes of this plant.") and Saco-Lowell Shops, 94 N.L.R.B. 647, 650 (1951) (var-
ious machine operators excluded from unit of machinists and tool and die makers be-
cause they were "specialists, and do not possess or utilize the rounded skills of the
[craft employees] discussed above.").
so American Potash & Chem. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1420 (1954).
31107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). The American Potash decision was made by a Board
which had been reconstituted by Eisenhower appointments since National Tube was
decided. Guy Farmer was appointed Chairman on July 13, 1953. Philip Ray Rodgers
took office on August 28, 1953. And on February 18, 1954, Albert C. Beeson filled the
vacancy created by the resignation of Paul L. Styles. Board members Abe Murdock
and Ivar H. Peterson had been appointed by President Truman.
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ing that the effect of the National Tube decision was seemingly incon-
sistent with the intent of Congress because it permanently foreclosed
"the possibility of establishing craft or departmental units in an entire
industry." 2
This time the Board found in the legislative history "a deep concern
on the part of the proponents of [section 9(b) (2)] for the equities of
craft employees and craft unions."8 Disavowing statutory authority
to deny craft employees the opportunity to vote for separate represen-
tation,84 the Board announced the following policy:
[W]e feel that the right of separate representation should not be denied
the members of a craft group merely because they are employed in an
industry which involves highly integrated production processes and in
which the prevailing pattern of bargaining is industrial in character. We
shall, therefore, not extend the practice of denying craft severance on an
industry-wide basis.
That practice ... would, if applied to other industries, result in the
emasculation of the principle of craft independence which clearly and
emphatically Congress intended to preserve. However, as we do not deem
it wise or feasible to upset a pattern of bargaining already firmly estab-
lished, we shall continue to decline to entertain petitions for craft or
departmental severance in those industries to which the Board has already
applied National Tube and where plantwide bargaining prevails. We
deem it sufficient for the purposes of this case to make it clear that the
National Tube doctrine will not be further extended, and that the practice
of denying craft severance in industry after industry on the so-called inte-
gration of operations theory will not be further followed.85
This policy announced in American Potash has since been adhered to
by the Board." On its authority craft employees have been permitted to
82 107 N.L.R.B. at 1420.
S Ibid.84 The Board stated: "It seems clear that Congress presumed that the specific com-
munity of interests among members of a skilled craft outweighs the community of
interests that exists among employees in general. Indeed, the very reason for the birth
and growth of craft unions lies in the needs of the skilled craftmen for a bargaining
representative which by history, tradition, and experience would be better equipped to
devote its efforts to the special problems peculiar to the specific craft involved, and
thereby be in the best position to serve and advance their interests .... [C]onsistent
with the clear intent of Congress, it is not the province of this Board to dictate the
course and pattern of labor organization in our vast industrial complex. If millions of
employees today feel that their interests are better served by craft unionism, it is not
for us to say that they can only be represented on an industrial basis .... All that
we are considering here is whether true craft groups should have an opportunity to
decide the issue for themselves. We conclude that we must afford them that choice in
order to give effect to the statute. 107 N.L.R.B. at 1420, 1422-23.85 Id. at 1421-22. (Emphasis added.) Member Peterson dissented. In his opinion,
the craft severance policy announced in American Potash was an abjuration of discre-
tion required of the Board by § 9(b). Id. at 1429-33.
88 In Pub. Serv. Co. of Indiana, 111 N.L.R.B. 618 (1955), the Board's long-standing
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vote for separate representation, in spite of prevailing plant-wide bar-
gaining and/or integrated production processes, in the aircraft indus-
try;87 the atomic energy industry; 8 the automotive parts industry; 9
the cellulose film manufacturing industry;"C the cement industry;" 1 the
chemical industry;92 the copper and copper alloy products manufac-
turing industry;" the copper mining and smelting industry;9" the elec-
trical products manufacturing industry;95 the film and fabric printing
industry;" the fish canning industry;"7 the food canning industry; 8
the glass industry;99 the gold dredging industry;' the magnesium in-
dustry; 101 the pulp and paper industry;' 2 the rayon yarn manufac-
policy with respect to public utilities, favoring the larger bargaining unit over the
smaller, and regarding the system-wide unit as the optimum unit, was followed, not-
withstanding American Potash. American Potash has also indirectly affected rep-
resentation proceedings in the civil service. Wortman, Collective Bargaining Strate-
gies and Tactics it; the Federal Civil Service, 15 LABn. Lj. 482, 486-87 (1964).
87 North Am. Aviation, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1090, 1093 (1956) ; North Am. Aviation,
Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1955); Rheem Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 904, 905-06
(1954) ; Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 591, 592 (1954).
88 Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1953), discussed in text
accompanying notes 77-79 supra, has been neither followed nor overruled. On the
authority of American Potash, the Board permitted separate representation of a
bargaining unit comprised of train crews at Dupont's Savannah River atomic energy
plant. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 649, 654 (1955). However,
separate representation for a proposed unit of maintenance electricians at the same
plant was later denied because the Board found that it did not constitute a true craft
group. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 723, 725 (1957) ; accord, E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co. (Dana Plant), 116 N.L.R.B. 286, 289 (1956). It would
seem that separate units of maintenance employees in the Carbide & Carbon K-25
plant would today be denied separate representation for the same reason.
89 Dana Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 365, 366 n.8 (1958).
90 Olin Mathieson Chem Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1444 (1957).
91 Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1389-90 (1954).
92E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 885, 886 n.4 (1960); Monsanto
Chem. Corp., 119 N.LaRB. 69, 74 (1957); Thiokol Chem. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 547,
549-50 (1955). But cf. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 888, 889-90 (1959).
03American Brass Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1277 (1958).94Kennecott Copper Corp., 138 NL.R.B. 118, 119 (1962); San Manuel Copper
Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1155-56 (1956).
95 General Elec. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 744, 746 n.4 (1954) (plant manufactured steam
turbines and superchargers); Moe Light Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1014 (1954) (light-
ing fixtures and defense plant).
96 Plastic Film Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1635, 1638 (1959).
97 California Fish Canners Assn, 108 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1322 (1954).
98 Campbell Soup Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 518, 519 (1954).
99 Puerto Rico Glass Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 102 (1960) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1728, 1730 (1957), enforcement denied, 270 F2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960) ; T.C. Wheaton Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 158 n.1 (1954) ;
cf. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co, 115 N.L.R.B. 1452, 1455-57 (1956), enforced, 241
F.2d 831 (4th Cir. 1957).
1o United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 661, 663 (1956).
101 Dow Chem. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1602, 1605 (1956).
102 Weyerhaeuser Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 998, 999 n.5 (1960); Lord Baltimore Press,
128 N.L.R.B. 333, 336 (1960) ; Ketchlkan Pulp Co, 115 N.L.R.B. 279, 281 (1956) ;
Southern Paperboard Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 302, 303 (1955); Rayonier, Inc., 110
N.L.R.B. 1191 (1954). See KVP Sutherland Paper Co, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 183, 56
L.R.R.M. 1125 (1964), appeal docketed, No. 16,073, 6th Cir., 1964.
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turing industry; "3 the silica products industry; 'o, the ship construction
industry;.0 5 the typewriter manufacturing industry;' 6 and the ura-
nium industry.' On the other hand, the Board has uniformly dis-
missed craft petitions in the "basic steel" industry,' the aluminum
industry,' 9 and the lumber industry."0
It would appear that the change in policy announced in American
Potash was not compelled by the Taft-Hartley Act's second proviso
to section 9(b). Rejection of the House Bill in favor of the less re-
strictive Senate proposal"' suggests that the Board's discretion to
determine the appropriateness of proposed craft units continued to be
derived from the authority conferred by section 9 (b). Section 9 (b)'s
broad directive would seem to encompass discretion to determine that
the presence of certain factors, such as integration of production proc-
esses, makes craft severance undesirable in any particular case. It
would seem also to encompass discretion to observe the doctrine of
stare decisis by relying upon such a determination in subsequent cases.
In National Tube, the Board began to identify the factors of integra-
tion of production processes and prevailing bargaining history with
certain industries as a whole. This practice as well probably falls within
the permissible limits of the Board's discretion, for section 9(b) (2)
would not seem to require the Board, in each craft representation pro-
ceeding involving the same industry, to consider evidence pertaining to
the presence of those factors in the industry as a whole. Indeed, once it
103 Beaunit Mills, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 651, 653 (1954).
3
0
4 General Refractories Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 81, 82 (1957).
105 Bethlehem Pac. Coast Steel Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 579, 581 (1957); Bethlehem
Steel Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 241, 243 (1954).
10 Royal McBee Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 896, 898 n.3 (1960), enforcement denied, 302
F2d 330 (4th Cir. 1962).
107 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 129 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 n.3 (1960) (production of
uranium salts and ingots); Vanadium Corp. of Am., 117 N.LR.B. 1390, 1393 n.6
(1957) (reduction of uranium and vanadium ore).10s Wheeling Steel Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 1453 (N.L.R.B. Adm. Dec. 1956).1 9 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 695 (1957) ; ef., Revere Copper
& Brass Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1955) (Craft representation permitted in plant in
which aluminum was cast and rolled into tubing and extruded shapes because plant
was not in "aluminum industry.")
110 Boise Cascade Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 57 L.RTR.M. 1056 (1964); Boise
Cascade Corp., 50 L.R.R.M. 1096 (NLRB Adm. Dec. 1962); Inyo Lumber Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 79 (1960); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., Case No. 36-RC-1169 (NLRB Adm.
Dec. 1956) (unreported) ; Seattle Cedar Lumber Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 54 (1955).
Craft severance was permitted in plywood manufacturing plants and a plant in which
logs were processed into utility poles and piling, because they were not in the "lum-
ber industry." Oroply Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1958) ; Arcata Plywood Corp., 120
N.L.R.B. 1648 (1958); Harbor Plywood Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 1429 (1958); J.H.
Baxter & Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 682 (1957); See Burke Millwork Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 522
(1952).
III See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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has been decided that the presence of certain factors makes craft sever-
ance undesirable in any particular industry, the Board might well pre-
sume that those factors are present in every craft representation pro-
ceeding involving a plant or operation within that industry, and place
the burden of proof to the contrary upon the proponent of craft sever-
ance. Such a presumption would not give res judicata effect to a prior
decisional rule for the Board's later determinations would rest upon
an examination of the facts of each case. Only when a previous
identification of factors with a particular industry completely fore-
closes later consideration of facts relating to the appropriateness of
a proposed craft unit would the Board seem to decide "that [a] craft
unit is inappropriate... on the ground that a different unit has been
established by a prior Board determination.2 1 2
Even assuming, however, that the Board has not exaggerated the
scope of section 9(b) (2)'s limitation upon its discretion, the grand-
father clause in American Potasz which excepted the "integrated in-
dustries" from the prospective rule for craft representation seems to
be insupportable. The only reason for continuing to dismiss petitions
for craft representation in the "integrated industries" was stated as
follows: "[W]e do not deem it wise or feasible to upset a pattern of
bargaining already firmly established." 1 ' This statement probably
fails to meet the standard of rational clarity required for judicial
review.'" The words "not... wise or feasible" state a conclusion; no
112 Section 9(b) (2) of the Act. Occasionally, the Board has given conclusive weight
to a prior determination that a craft unit was not appropriate in a particular industry.
For example, the Board stated in Scullin Steel Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 530, 532 (1951):
The IBEWs contention that the electricians at the Employer's plant constitute an
appropriate unit is based on craft considerations. We find it unnecessary to de-
termine whether the employees whom the IBEW seeks to represent constitute a
recognized craft group, because the record clearly indicates that the Employer's
operations place it within the basic steel industry, where the Board has declined
to sever craft employees from an industrial unit. We shall, therefore order that the
petition of the IBEW be dismissed and shall find appropriate the plant-wide unit
sought by the Steelworkers.
Other cases in which the Board apparently treated the leading "integrated industries"
cases as res judicata in dismissing petitions for craft representation are: Boise Cascade
Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 53 p. 4, 57 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1964); Inyo Lumber Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 79, 81 (1960) ; Seattle Cedar Lumber Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1955) ;
Reynolds Metals Co, 89 N.L.R.B. 802, 803 (1950); Magnolia Lumber Co., 88 N.L.R.B.
161, 162 (1950). It is doubtful that these cases could presently survive judicial review,
for Board action is "arbitrary" and subject to reversal when it contravenes statutory
language buttressed by legislative history and is unsupported by valid independent
rationale. Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957), Accord, Hotel Employees
v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958). See note 120 infra.118 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1421 (1954).
114 § 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1007(b) (1958), provides, inter alia, "All decisions... shall... include a statement of(1) findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basi.s therefor, upon all the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record... ." (Emphasis
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rationale was or has been offered as to why "a pattern of bargaining
already firmly established" should be sacrosanct only in the previously
selected "integrated industries." Since American Potash, the Board
has upset many "a pattern of bargaining already firmly established"
in other industries, by permitting true craft groups to vote for separate
representation by unions which traditionally represent their particular
crafts.115
Unequal treatment based upon the "integrated industries" grand-
father clause may deprive both employers and employees in the
"integrated industries" of due process of law."' There seems to be
no reason to allow craft employees to vote for separate representation
in some industries, despite the presence of integrated production proc-
esses and prevailing bargaining history on a broader basis, but not
in others. As indicated above, no clearly articulated rationale has been
offered by the Board. Although it has been rejected by the Board,"7
a due process attack against the "integrated industries" policy appears
to have been accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,... the Fourth Circuit denied
enforcement of a Board order requiring an employer to bargain with
a craft unit of electricians in one of its plants. The Board had deter-
mined that, under American Potash, the craft unit was appropriate,
notwithstanding integration of operations at the plant and a history of
added.) In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson
stated, "If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports
to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will
not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's ac-
tion." Accord, Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).
See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1061, 1064 (1965) ; American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 971-72 (1965) (concurring opinion) ; Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196-97 (1941); cf. Mary Carter Paint Co. v.
FTC, 333 F2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1964); Jarman v. United States, 219 F. Supp.
108, 117-18 (D. Md. 1963).
Ill See cases cited in notes 87-107 supra.
116 Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only
to states, "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.... [D]iscrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499(1954). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886); NLRB v. Gene Compton's Corp., 262 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir.
1959); Sims v. Rives, 84 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Pfeiffer Brewing Co. v.
Bowles, 146 U.S. 1006, 1007 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945).
Cf. Local 128 Retail Clerks v. Leedom, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 72,475 (D.D.C. 1958).
In Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964), Judge Brown
observed recently, "[Liaw does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right
to do that which it denies to another similarly situated. There may not be a rule
for Monday, another for Tuesday, a rule for general application, but denied outright
in a specific case." Id. at 660 (concurring opinion).
117 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1728, 1730 (1957); Dow Chem. Co.,
116 N.L.R.B. 1602, 1605 (1956).
"'s 270 F2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960).
[VOL. 40 :324
NLRB--"INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES" POLICY
plantwide bargaining in the plate glass industry generally. The Court
held that application of the American Potash rule in that case was
"arbitrary and discriminatory" in view of the Board's refusal to grant
craft severance under similar circumstances in the "integrated indus-
tries." '119 If a unit determination based upon the American Potash rule
was "discriminatory" as applied to an employer outside the "integrated
industries," it would seem to follow that denial of separate representa-
tion to a proposed craft unit which is appropriate, but for being in
an "integrated industry," is also "discriminatory." Furthermore, be-
cause it is impossible to believe that Congress conferred upon the
Board the power to act discriminatorily, the Board's unequal treat-
ment of employers and craft employees in the "integrated industries"
would seem to exceed its statutory authority.1 0
III. JUDiciA REmEDIEs
Section 9(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides for
indirect judicial review of the Board's bargaining unit determina-
tions 1 1 These determinations may be reviewed by circuit courts of
appeals in suits instituted by the Board under section 10(e) 2 2 to
119 Id. at 174. Accord, Royal McBee Corp. v. NLRB, 302 F2d 330, 332 (4th Cir.
1962); f. NLRB v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 291 F2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1961); compare
NLRB v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 276 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1960). The Board has not acqui-
esced in the decision. See, e.g., MAllinckrodt Chem. Works, 129 N.L.R.B. 312, 315 n.3
(1960) ; F. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 126 N.L.B. 885, 886 n.3 (1960).1 20 Action taken by an administrator or an administrative agency which is unauthor-
ized by statute is "arbitrary" action. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 172
(1936) ; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902) ;
United States ex rel. Foo Fong v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 15, 719 (2d Cir. 1955)
Local 128 Retail Clerks v. Leedom, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 71, 475 (D.D.C. 1958) ; cf.
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 277 (1933); ICC v. Louis-
ville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913). The Board's determination that a proposed
bargaining unit is inappropriate may be set aside if it is "so unreasonable and arbitrary
as to exceed the Board's power...." Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,
491 (1947); See May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380 (1945) (Judicial
review of section 9(b) proceedings is to "guarantee against arbitrary action by the
Board."); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 135 (1944) (Board's unit
determinations were not "lacking in a 'rational basis."') ; cf. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup.
Ct. 980, 985 (1965). See, e.g, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d
478, 480 (10th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Hurley Co., 310 F.2d 158 161 (8th Cir. 1962);
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 19615 ; International Typo-
graphical Union v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1961), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
365 U.S. 705 (1961) ; NLRB v. Plankinton Packing Co., 265 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir.
1959) ; NLRB v. J. W. Rex Co., 243 F.2d 346, 359-60 (3rd Cir. 1957) ; NLRB v. Amer-
ican Steel Buck Co., 227 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1955) (per curiam) ; Foreman & Clark,
Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 405-06 (9th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. Williams, 195 F2d
669, 671 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 402, 404 (D.C. Cir.
1950) ; NLRB v. Salant & Salant, Inc., 271 F.2d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 1948).
12161 Stat 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1958).
122 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
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enforce orders to cease and desist from an unfair labor practice, or
in a suit instituted under section 10(f)123 by "any person aggrieved"
by such an order.'2 ' Indirect review was provided by Congress in
order to obviate the industrial strife and delay in collective bargaining
which were expected to result from direct review of Board elections
and certifications.125
Ordinarily, issues raised in representation proceedings before the
Board are reviewed on appeal from an order to bargain, directed either
to an employer or to a union as bargaining representative.'26 However,
a union which desires separate representation for a proposed unit of
craft employees is not in a position to require or refrain from collective
bargaining after its petition is dismissed. Its only apparent means for
obtaining judicial review of such a dismissal under the statutory re-
view provisions is to engage in an unfair labor practice by bringing
unlawful economic pressure to bear upon the employer.
For example, by picketing for recognition at the employer's premises,
craft employees whose petition for separate representation has been
dismissed may engage in three separate unfair labor practices. If the
employer has recognized another union as representative of a broader
bargaining unit, such picketing violates section 8 (b) (7) (A) .17 If the
union presently recognized by the employer has been certified by the
Board as representative of the employees whom the craft union seeks
to represent, such picketing may also violate section 8(b) (4) (i) (C)' 8
and section 8(b) (4) (ii) (C).11' The craft employees' picketing may
be enjoined in a suit brought by the Board under section 10(1),"*
123 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
124 A union may not seek judicial review of a rival's certification under § 10(f), be-
cause neither a certification nor direction of election is an "order" under § 10. AFL v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), accord, Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476
(1964).
125 See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477-80 (1964); Leedom v. Kyne,
358 U.S. 184, 191-94 (1958) (dissenting opinion) ; AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409-10
(1940).
126 An employer may obtain judicial review of representation proceedings by refusing
to bargain with his employees' bargaining representative. Such a refusal constitutes a
violation of § 8(a) (5) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1959).
If a charge is filed, if a complaint is issued, and if the complaint is processed through
to a final order, the employer may seek review of that order in the appropriate court
pursuant to § 10(f), note 123 supra. Similarly, a union which is a bargaining repre-
sentative may obtain judicial review of representation proceedings by refusing to
bargain with the employer. Such a refusal constitutes a violation of § 8(b) (3) of the
Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1958).
127 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (a) (Supp. V, 1964).
128 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (C) (Supp. V, 1964).
129 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (C) (Supp. V, 1964).
13073 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. V, 1964).
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and, if the picketing violates section 8(b) (4), their union may be
liable for any damages caused. 8'
It is possible that craft employees whose petition for separate repre-
sentation has been dismissed on the basis of the "integrated industries"
policy have an alternative means for obtaining judicial review. The
Supreme Court, in Leedom v. Kyne,"2 held that federal district courts
have jurisdiction to set aside a unit determination which is made in
excess of the Board's delegated powers and contrary to a specific
statutory prohibition. In Kyne, the Board determined that certain
non-professional employees should be included in a bargaining unit
of which the majority were professional employees, without permitting
the professional employees to vote on the question. After the profes-
sional employees' association won a subsequent representation election
and was certified as bargaining representative for the expanded unit, its
president sued in federal district cour' 8 to set the election aside, con-
tending that the Board's determination exceeded its powers under
section 9 (b) (1).', The Board, on appeal, conceded that its determina-
tion exceeded its powers, but contended that district court jurisdiction
was precluded by the statutory review provisions of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act." 5 The Supreme Court affirmed summary judg-
ment in the plaintiff's favor.
The Court read section 9 (b) (1) to be "a definite statutory prohibi-
tion of conduct which would thwart the declared purpose of the legis-
lation .... ",I" It stated that the Board's inclusion of non-professional
employees in a unit of professional employees, without permitting the
professional employees to vote on the question, was "plany... an
attempted exercise of power that had been specifically withheld." ' 7
'1361 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958).
132 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
1.33 Jurisdiction was based upon Section 24 of the judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1959): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or pro-
ceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce...:' The Court did
not pass upon plaintiff's separate contention that the district court had jurisdiction to
review the Board's unit determination under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1959). For a recent discussion advocating
expanded judicial review under § 10, see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
Judical Review, 65 CoL1um. L. REv. 55 (1965).
is*§ 9(b) (1) of the Act, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1959), pro-
vides: "[T]he Board shall not decide that any unit is appropriate [for purposes of
collective bargaining] if such unit includes both professional employees and employees
who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees
vote for inclusion in such unit..."
135 See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
186 358 U.S. at 189. (Quoting Texas & New Orleang R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930)).
337 Id. at 189.
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The Court then reasoned that Congress, in section 9(b) (1), assured
professional employees a "right" to vote upon the question of inclusion
in a mixed bargaining unit.' Absence of federal jurisdiction "would
mean 'a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress' has given
professional employees, for there is no other means, within their control
... to enforce and protect that right."' 9  It followed that Congress
intended the professional employees' right to be enforced in federal
district courts: "Surely... a Federal District Court has jurisdiction
of an original suit to prevent deprivation of a right so given.'.
Kyne has since been narrowly interpreted. One circuit court of ap-
peals which relied upon the case to sustain direct review of a represen-
tation proceeding has been reversed by the Supreme Court.' With
respect to review of dismissal of a petition for craft representation
under Kyne, another court has said, in dictum, that the "American
Potash doctrine.., lies within the discretionary area of Board unit de-
138 Ibid.
139 358 U.S. at 190.
140 Id. at 189.
1"1 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). In this case the district court
enjoined an election on the ground that the Board's findings of fact with respect to a
disputed joint employer relationship were insufficient as a matter of law. The court of
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, reversing, stated, "The Kyne exception is a
narrow one, not to be extended to permit plenary district court review of Board
orders in certification proceedings whenever it can be said that an erroneous assessment
of the particular facts before the Board has led it to a conclusion which does not com-
port with the law." Id. at 481. Cf. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the
Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 33 U.S.L. W=EK 4369, 4371 (April 28, 1965);
McCulloch v. Sociedad de Marineras, 372 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1963). District court juris-
diction to review representation proceedings has been denied by courts of appeals in,
e.g., the following cases: Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 323 F.2d 477, 479 (6th
Cir. 1963) (The Board had discretion to determine that certain dispatchers were "em-
ployees."); Milk Drivers v. McCulloch, 306 F2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (The Board
did not exceed its authority under § 9(c)(3) by directing an election after two years
in the face of a valid three-year contract.); Consolidated Emerson Co. v. NLRB,
302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962) (The Board had discretion to ignore its "accretion doc-
trine" in making a unit determination.); McLeod v. Local 476, Industrial Workers,
288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961) (The Board had discretion to rule that a contract contain-
ing an amended union security clause, unlawful prior to amendment, did not bar an
election.) ; Local 1545 United Bd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F2d 127 (2d Cir.
1960) (The Board had discretion to apply new contract bar rules retroactively.) ; Lee-
dom v. Electrical Workers, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (The Board did not violate
§ 9(c) (1) by allowing an independent union to intervene in decertification proceedings
and providing for three-way choice in decertification election.) ; International Ass'n of
Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815
(1960) (The Board did not violate § 9(c) (5) by basing a unit determination upon prior
bargaining history.); National Biscuit Div. v. Leedom, 265 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959) (The Board did not violate § 9(c)( 2 ) by applying its
"schism doctrine" and directing an election in this case.) But see Miami Pressman's
Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (The Board could not set aside
an election because of an infirmity in its own procedure for denying a request for
review of a Regional Director's direction of election.); but cf. Farmer v. United Elec.
Workers, 211 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 (1954). See also
Deering Milliken Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F2d 856, 861-62 (4th Cir. 1961).
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terminations."'4 2 And a distinguished commentator has predicted that
"it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would permit judicial
review of such rulings as National Tube Co. or American Potash Co.""'
Nevertheless, Kyne should allow for federal district court jurisdic-
tion to set aside dismissal of a petition for craft representation when
the Board treats the leading "integrated industries" cases as res
judicata.W " Section 9(b) (2), which is introduced by the same proscrip-
tive "shall not" as section 9(b) (1), would seem to be a "clear and
mandatory"'" statutory prohibition. It can be said that, in enacting
section 9(b) (2), Congress assured craft employees of a "right" not to
be deprived of an opportunity to vote for separate representation on
the ground that a different unit had been established by a prior deter-
mination. 4 Apart from a suit in federal district court, there is no
means entirely within their control by which craft employees can obtain
judicial review.' Furthermore, petitions for separate craft representa-
tion in the "integrated industries" will ordinarily request severance
from a broader unit which has an established history of collective bar-
gaining; the craft employees whose petition is denied apparently have
no choice but to disrupt industrial peace if they are to obtain statutory
judicial review 48 In these circumstances, the need for an exercise of
judicial authority to set aside an administrative determination made in
excess of delegated powers, would seem to outweigh the policy opposing
delays in collective bargaining and resulting industrial strife.
Finally, a substantial assertion of unconstitutional harm may provide
a basis for federal district court jurisdiction to review dismissal of a
petition for craft representation which is based upon the "integrated
industries" policy. Jurisdiction to review Board action which allegedly
142 Leedom v. Paper Prod. Union, 275 F.Zd 628, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
143 Cox, Major Decisions of the Supreme Court October Term 1958, ABA SEcTo
ox LAnoR RELATIONS 1959 PROCEEDINGS 23, 35 (1960).
14 See note 112, supra. Cf. Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v. Dixon, 1965 Trade Cas.
ff 71,370 (D.C. Cir. February 11, 1965).
'45 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). Cf. Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 249
F.2d 506, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1957), ree.?d, 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (dissenting opinion.)
'46 See S. REP. No. 105 in 1 LBa. HIsT. 416-31, quoted note 10 supra; H. R. REP.
No. 245 in 1 LEG. HIST. 327-28.
'47 Cox v. McCulloch, 315 F2d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1963). As in Kyne, issuance of a
cease-and-desist order under § 10(c), the prerequisite to judicial review under § 9(d),
see notes 133 and 136 supra, depends upon (a) the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board and (b) the Board's issuance of an unfair labor practice com-
plaint, neither of which events are within the control of the party seeking review. See
Lebouef v. Pisle, 58 L.IR.M. 2368 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Division 1267 Street Employees
v. Ordman, 320 F.2d 729, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Foreman v. NLRB, 50 L.R.R.M. 2855
(6th Cir. 1962); Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320, 322-23 (10th Cir.
1952) ; Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1948).
148 See text accompanying notes 126-31, supra.
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resulted in denial of due process has been sustained on appeal in two
cases;1 9 but the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have,
in dictum, kept the possibility alive. 5' Assertion of unconstitutional
harm may not justify equitable intervention by a federal district court
when later administrative or judicial remedies may make disposition
of the constitutional issue unnecessary. 5' However, it would seem that
judicial intervention should be available to craft employees who are
otherwise assured of judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional Board
action only by seriously disrupting industrial peace."'
ROBERT M. KENNA_
149 Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 1949).
1"0 Typographical Union v. McCullock, 59 L.R.R.M. 2161, 2163 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943) ("All con-
stitutional questions aside, it is for Congress to determine how the rights which it
creates shall be enforced."); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 302 F2d 354, 355
(2d Cir. 1962) ; Boyles Galvanizing Co. v. Waers, 291 F2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1961).
Cf. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F2d 205, 209 n.8 (7th Cir. 1960).
151 See Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden, 328 F.2d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
152 See text accompanying notes 126-31 supra.
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